Introduction
A consumer faces a switching cost between sellers when an investment speci c to his current seller must be duplicated for a new seller. That investment might be in equipment, in setting up a relationship, in learning how to use a product, or in buying a high-priced rst unit that then allows one to buy subsequent units more cheaply (when rms' prices are non-linear). Switching costs may even be psychological.
1 Klemperer (1995) gives many examples of each of these kinds of switching costs, and Section 2.2 discusses empirical evidence for switching costs.
Switching costs may be learning costs, in which case consumer who switches from rm A to rm B has no switching cost of later buying from either rm.
Alternatively, switching costs may be transactional, in which case a consumer who switches from A to B would incur an additional switching cost if he reswitched back to A (an example is the cost of returning rented equipment and renting from a new supplier). Of course, many switching costs have both learning and transactional aspects.
We will generally assume that switching costs are real social costs, but there can also be contractual or pecuniary switching costs (that are not social costs). Examples include airlines' \frequent-yer" programs, and \loyalty contracts" that rebate a fraction of past payments to consumers who continue to patronise the rm. These pecuniary switching costs are a form of quantity discount or bundling. Lars Stole (forthcoming) discusses such price discrimination strategies elsewhere in this Volume, so we will focus mainly on \real" switching costs.
We assume consumers have perfect information about the existence and qualities of all rms' products, even before purchasing any. So \new" consumers who have not yet developed an attachment to any particular prod-1 Social psychologists have shown that consumers change their own preferences in favour of products that they have previously chosen or been given, in order to reduce \cognitive dissonance" (Brehm, 1956 ).
uct are especially important in markets with switching costs. In contrast, \search costs" directly a ect even consumers' initial purchases. But, search costs and switching costs have much in common, and models of the e ects of switching costs can also apply to search costs. For example, either kind of friction makes a rm's market share important for its future pro tability (see Section 2.6) and much empirical work does not distinguish between search and switching costs.
2 For a survey of search costs, see, for example, Stiglitz (1989) in Volume 1 of this Series.
\Experience-good" markets in which consumers need to purchase a product to determine its quality (see Nelson, 1970 ) also have much in common with switching-cost markets, but with experience goods, unlike with switching costs, complications can arise from the possibility of prices signaling qualities, and from the existence of consumers who disliked the product they last purchased.
3
Switching costs not only apply to repeat-purchases of identical goods.
An important class of examples involves \follow on" goods, such as spare parts and repair services, bought in \aftermarkets": buyers face additional \switching" costs if the follow-on goods are not compatible with the original 2 For example, empirical ndings about the credit card (Ausubel (1991) etc. { see note CC) and telecommunications (see, e.g., Knittel (1997)) markets, and about the e ects of rms' discount rates on prices (Froot and Klemperer (1989) , Chevalier and Sharfstein (1996) , Fitoussi and Phelps (1988) etc.) could be the result of either switching or search costs. On the other hand, Moshkin and Schachar (2000) develop a discrete-choice empirical model to estimate how many consumers behave as if they have switching costs and search costs respectively. Their test is based on the fact that whereas the switching probability of a consumer facing search costs depends on the match between his tastes and the attributes of the alternative he last chose, the switching probability of a consumer facing switching costs depends on the match between his tastes and the attributes of all available alternatives. Using panel data on television viewing choices, they suggest 72% of viewers act as if they have switching costs between TV channels, while 28% act as if they have search costs.
3 [Note V] Schmalensee (1982) and Villas Boas (2000) analyse models of experience goods that show similarities to switching costs models. For related models in which consumers di er in their \quality" from rms' point of view, and rms are uncertain about consumers they have not supplied and can exploit those they know to be of \high quality", see, for example, Nilssen (2000) and Cohen (2001) on insurance markets and Sharpe (1990) and Zephirin (1994) on bank loan markets.
purchase, as may be the case if they are not bought from the same rm.
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Consumers may also incur switching costs, or \shopping costs", at a single date by buying related products from multiple suppliers rather than from a single supplier. (These \shopping costs" can also be real social costs or contractual costs created by quantity discounts and \bundling".) However, most of the literature focuses on dynamic problems and emphasises the resulting commitment problems.
In the simplest cases, when rms can commit to future prices and qualities, a market with switching costs is closely analogous to a market with economies of scope in production; with switching costs each individual consumer can be viewed as a \market" with economies of scope between \pur-chases now" and \purchases later". Just as a market with production economies of scope is entirely captured by the rm with the lowest total costs in the simplest price-competition model, so in a simple model with complete contracts each individual buyer's lifetime's requirements in a market with switching costs are lled by the lowest-cost supplier of those requirements.
That is, rms compete on \lifecycle" prices and the market lifecycle price is determined by lifecycle costs, with any subdivision of the lifecycle price 4 Aftermarkets have been much studied since a US Supreme Court decision (ITS v. Kodak, [cite]) held that it was conceptually possible for ITS, an independent repair rm, to prove that Kodak had illegally monopolized the aftermarket for servicing Kodak photocopiers: see e.g. Shapiro (1995), Shapiro and Teece (1998), MacKie-Mason and Metzler (1999), and Borenstein, MacKie-Mason, and Netz (1995, 2000) .
5 Similar issues arise when retailers each advertise the prices of only some of their products (often the \loss leaders"), but expect consumers who enter their stores to buy other products also. See, for example, Lal and Matutes (1994) . The unadvertised product may actually be the \quality" of the advertised product (Ellison (2003), Vickers (2003)).
6 Typically, a consumer who has not previously bought from any rm incurs a start-up cost similar to (or greater than) the new investment (switching cost) that a brand switcher must make. We will use the term \switching cost" to include these start-up costs. So a consumer may have a \switching cost" of making a rst purchase. In many models consumers have high enough willingnesses to pay that this cost has little consequence since it does not a ect consumers' preferences between rms.
7 Sometimes costs of forming a new relationship fall upon the supplier, not (or as well as) on the customer, and rms' costs of serving new customers have parallels to consumers' switching costs (see Klemperer (1995) ). Firms' switching costs have been less studied, but in some contexts, such as the simple model of the next subsection, the total prices (including any switching costs) paid by consumers are una ected by whether rms or consumers actually pay the switching costs. Thus the equilibrium incidence need not coincide with the apparent incidence of switching costs.
being arbitrary and meaningless. In this case, the outcome is e cient and switching costs confer no market power on rms.
This simple analogy|including the e ciency of the outcome|can survive even if rms cannot credibly commit to future prices or qualities. But even small steps outside the simplest story suggest ways in which the analogy and the e ciency break down (Section 2.3). The analogy is still weaker if rms cannot discriminate between di erent customers (Section 2.4), or consumers use multiple suppliers (Section 2.5). After treating these cases (and having discussed empirical evidence in Section 2.2), we analyse the \market share" competition that switching costs generate (Section 2.6). All this discussion takes both the switching costs and the number of rms as exogenous, so we then consider entry (Section 2.7) and endogenous switching costs (Section 2.8), before addressing implications for competition policy (Section 2.9).
Empirical Evidence
The empirical literature on switching costs is much smaller and more recent than the theoretical literature. Some studies test speci c aspects of the theory (see later sections), but only a few studies directly attempt to measure switching costs.
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Where micro data on individual consumers' purchases are available, a discrete choice approach can be used to explore the determinants of a consumer's probability of purchasing from a particular rm. Greenstein (1993) analyses federal procurement of commercial mainframe computer systems during the 1970s, and nds that an agency is likely to acquire a system from an incumbent vendor, even when controlling for factors other than the buyer's purchase history that may have in uenced the vendor-buyer match; he suggests switching costs were an important source of incumbent advantage in this market. One defect of all these studies is that none of them models the dynamic e ects of switching costs that (as we discuss below) are the main focus of the theoretical literature; in e ect, these empirical studies assume consumers myopically maximise current utility without considering the future e ects of their choices.
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Other empirical studies, many of which we will discuss below in the con- The core model of the switching costs literature posits that rms cannot commit to future prices.
The simplest model has two periods and two symmetric rms, with costs c t in periods t = 1; 2.
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A single consumer has a switching cost s and reservation price r t > c t + s for one unit of the period t good, rms set prices, and there is no discounting. Then in period 2 the rm that sold in period 1 will exercise its ex post market power by pricing (just below) c 2 + s (the rival rm will o er price c 2 but make no sale). Foreseeing this, rms are willing to price below cost in period 1 to acquire the customer who will become a valuable follow-on purchaser in period 2; undi erentiated competition to win the customer drives period-1 prices down to c 1 s: 
16
Although the switching cost strikingly a ects price in each period, it does not a ect the life-cycle price c 1 + c 2 that the consumer pays in the simple model of this subsection. As in the case of full commitment noted in section 2.1, we can here view the life-cycle (the bundle consisting of the period-1 good and the period-2 good) as the real locus of competition, and competition in that product has worked exactly as one would hope. In particular, the absence of price commitment did not lead to any ine ciency in this very simple model.
Ine ciency of the Price-Path
Although the outcome above is socially e cient, the inability to contract in period 1 on period-2 prices in general leads to ine ciencies, even if rms still (that is, constrained by B), while if B made the period-2 sale, its period-2 price would be p B2 = c A2 + s: In this case, the prices that rms charge in period 1 (and hence also rms' incentives to invest in cost reduction, etc.) depend on whether the consumer has rational expectations about the period-2 prices it will face or whether the consumer acts myopically. We discuss the role of expectations in Section 2.4.5. Other simple models such as that in Klemperer (1995, Section 3.2) sidestep the issue of consumers' expectations by assuming period-2 prices are constrained by consumers' reservation price r 2 ; hence independent of consumers' period-1 choice. The distinction between these modelling approaches is crucial in some analyses of network e ects (see Section 3.7.3).
It is important for the modelling that the customer buys from just one rm in period 1. If a unit mass of consumers splits evenly betwen the rms in period 1, there may be no pure-strategy equilibrium in period 2. See note MSE.
15 Skott and Jepsen (2000) argue that a tough drug policy may encourage the aggressive marketing of illegal drugs to new users, by increasing the costs of switching between dealers.
16 For example, the many-period extension of this model is Beggs and Klemperer (1992 In our simple model rms make zero pro ts with or without switching costs. But switching costs and the higher ex-post prices and lower ex-ante prices that they create can either raise or lower oligopolists' pro ts. The reason is that, in cutting its rst-period price, each rm sets its marginal rstperiod pro t sacri ce equal to its marginal second-period gain, so the total rst-period pro t given up can be greater or less than the total second-period gain (see, especially, Klemperer (1987a,b)). However, the arguments we will review in Section 2.4 (which also apply to two-period models) suggest rms typically gain from switching costs (see, especially, Klemperer (1987b)). 18 There may also be limits on rms' ability to price discriminate in favour of new customers without, for example, antagonizing their \regular" customers. See Section 2.4 for the case in which price-discrimination is infeasible. 21 This assumes all consumers have reservation prices exceeding c + (1 )s for a single unit in each period, and that all consumers survive into the next period with the same probability, , so a consumer's value is independent of his age. If consumers live for exactly two periods the price paths in general depend on whether rms can directly distinguish between old and new consumers (as in the previous subsection) or cannot do this (as in this section). switch, and new entrants' expected discounted pro ts are zero. Thus the price paths consumers face are exactly as if rms could perfectly discriminate between them. In either case one can think of every (new and old) consumer as getting a \discount" of s in every period re ecting the present value of the full extent to which he can be exploited in the future by his existing seller, given his option of paying s to switch to an entrant; simultaneously, every \old" consumer is indeed exploited by s in every period. The outcome is socially e cient.
Price Patterns in a Closed Oligopoly
Just as in the free-entry model, if there is a small number of rms who face no threat of entry and who cannot distinguish between cohorts of consumers, it is possible that in every period one rm might hold a \sale", setting a low price to attract new consumers, while the other(s) set a higher price to exploit their old consumers. Farrell and Shapiro (1988) explore such an equilibrium, but their model in e ect has just one new and one old consumer in each period. Since it is therefore inevitable that at the beginning of any period one rm has no customer base while the other already has half the market \locked-in", it is not surprising that this model yields rms o ering asynchronous sales. However, Padilla (1995)'s many-customer model has similar features to Farrell and Shapiro's; in his model, although rms mix across prices, the rm that currently has more locked-in customers has greater incentive to charge a high price to exploit them, and so sets high prices with greater probabilities than its rival.
More generally it seems unclear whether oligopolists will hold sales simultaneously or not. For example, it might make most sense to forgo short run pro ts to go after new customers when your rivals are not doing so. But if switching costs are learning costs, then staggered sales cause switching between rms and thus create a pool of consumers who have no further costs of switching, thus intensifying future competition (see Section 2.5). Indeed Klemperer (1983 Klemperer ( , 1989 ) and the extension of the latter model in Elzinga and Mills (1999) all have simultaneous sales.
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Another possibility is that rather than holding occasional sales, each oligopolist in every period sets a single intermediate price that trades o its incentives to set a low price to attract new consumers and to set a high price to exploit its old customers. In a steady-state model each rm's price will then be the same in every period. This can only be an equilibrium under certain conditions: If the ow of new consumers is too large, at least one rm would deviate from any candidate equilibrium by cutting price signi cantly to specialise in new consumers. If some consumers' switching costs and reservation prices are too large, at least one rm would deviate by raising price signi cantly to exploit old customers while giving up on new ones. And if rms' products are undi erentiated except by switching costs, there cannot easily be a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium because each rm would have incentive to undercut the other slightly to win the new consumers.
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But when none of these conditions applies, there may be a stationary \no-sales" equilibrium, and much of the literature examines such equilibria. Varian (1980) , analyse single-period models in which consumers have exogenously given switching costs (or models that can be interpreted in this way) that yield mixed strategy equilibria, and Padilla (1995) is a multi-period model yielding mixed strategy equilibria. However, adding more real-world features to some of these models yields either asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria or symmetric pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria (if information is incomplete) rather than mixed-strategy equilibria.
The former (asymmetric) outcome can be interpreted as asynchronous sales. Deneckere et al obtain this kind of equilibium when they allow rms to choose the times at which they set their prices; they nd that the rm with fewer locked-in customers sets price second and holds a \sale".
The latter (symmetric) outcome corresponds to \tradeo pricing" of the kind discussed in the next paragraph. Bulow and Klemperer (1998, Appendix B) give an example of this by incorporating incomplete information about rms' costs into a one-period model with exogenous switching costs that would otherwise yield mixed-strategy equilibria.
24 However, if consumers have rational expectations about future prices, a small price cut may win only a fraction of new consumers. We discuss consumers' expectations below.
25 Even if there are occasional \sales" the need to balance exploiting the old with attracting the new will be present in \ordinary" periods, and this literature is relevant to these ordinary periods.
In the case of monopoly, both stationary \no-sales" models (see Holmes, 1990 ) and models in which periodic sales arise in equilibrium (see Gallini and Karp, 1989 ) can be constructed.
An example of a no-sales model is Beggs and Klemperer (1992), in the equilibrium of which, in period t, rm i sets price
in which c i is i's cost, i t 1 is the fraction of consumers i sold to in the previous period, or i's previous-period \market share", and , , and are positive constants. These constants depend on the discount factor between periods, the market growth rate, the rate at which individual consumers leave the market, and the extent to which the rms' products are functionally di erentiated; when rms are symmetric, the steady-state equilibrium price increases in the last of these parameters and decreases in the other three. 
Industry Dynamics
We have seen that sometimes a rm with few locked-in customers holds a sale while its rivals with larger customer bases do not. Similarly, in most no-sale models in which all rms sell to both old and new consumers, rms with more old locked-in customers have a greater incentive to exploit them and therefore price higher and so win a smaller share of new unattached consumers. In both cases, the result is stable industry dynamics as more aggressive smaller rms catch up with larger ones.
In the equilibrium of Beggs' and Klemperer's (1992) no-sale duopoly model, described in (1) above, for example, > 0, so larger rms charge higher prices, yielding stable dynamics.
Indeed, it can be shown that 
The Level of Pro ts
Most multi-period models suggest switching costs raise rms' pro ts.
In a model which generates asynchronous sales, a duopoly can earn positive pro ts in price competition even if rms' products are undi erentiated except by switching costs. The switching costs segment the market, and when one rm (generally the rm with the currently larger customer base) charges a high price to exploit its locked-in customers, the other rm can then exercise market power even over new consumers. Farrell and Shapiro (1988) illustrate this in their very simple model which has just one new customer in every period and rms setting prices sequentially, and although these assumptions can be criticised, Padilla (1995) generates the same phenomenon in a many-customer model in which rms set prices simultaneously. In both these models, a duopolist earns positive pro ts even in a period in which it starts with no locked-in customers. (Of course, if there were two identical new rms entering in every period, they would not generally earn any pro ts.) Furthermore, if switching costs are heterogenous, this e ect does not require the assumption that rms do not discriminate between their old 27 In the terminology introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) . In the terminology introduced by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) , there is strategic complementarity between a rm's current price and its competitors' future prices. See also Farrell (1986a).
customers and customers who are new to them|see our discussion of Chen (1997) and Taylor (2003) in Section 2.5.1, below.
We now show that the symmetric stationary price of a \no-sales" equilibrium of the kind described in the previous section is also usually higher than if there were no switching costs. There are two reasons:
First, price levels may be raised by switching costs through the \fat cat" e ect discussed above; rms price less aggressively because they recognise that if they win fewer customers today, their rivals will be bigger and (in simple models) less aggressive tomorrow.
Second, when consumers face switching costs, they must form expectations of future prices. Depending on how these expectations are formed, this may make the demand of new customers, who are not yet locked into any rm, either more or less elastic. However, as we now discuss, the presumption is that it makes it less elastic than absent switching costs, thus raising rms' prices and pro ts.
The E ect of Consumers' Expectations on Prices
How consumers use current prices (including any departures from the current prices that they had expected to see) in forming expectations about future prices critically a ects competition and the price level|just as in other parts of the lock-in literature.
28 Consumers' expectations about their own future tastes also matter in a market with real (functional) product di erentation;
we assume consumers expect some positive correlation between their current and future tastes.
In a static di erentiated products market, or in each period of a repeated market without switching costs, each consumer compares di erences between products' prices with di erences between how well the products match his current tastes. But with switching costs, the consumer recognises that the product he chooses today will, because of those costs, very likely be the 28 Consumers' expectations about how future prices depend on costs are, of course, also important in determining whether rms have the correct incentives to invest in future cost reduction. This issue does not seem to have been directly addressed by the switching-costs literature, but we discuss in Section 3.7 how a network-e ects model can be reinterpreted to address it. See also [note 2.3.1].
product he buys tomorrow. So switching costs raise or lower the consumer's willingness to change brands in response to a price cut if, roughly speaking, he expects that price cut to be more or less permanent than his tastes.
(i) Consumers who Assume any Price Cut below their Expected Price will be
Maintained in the Future
If consumers expect that a rm that cuts price today will maintain that price cut forever then, relative to the case of no switching costs, they are more in uenced by such a price cut than by their current product preferences which are not fully permanent.
29 (In the limit with in nite switching costs, consumers are choosing a product for the whole of time and, if they do not know their future preferences, products are in e ect much less di erentiated.)
So switching costs then lower equilibrium prices; see von Weizs• acker's (1984) model in which each rm chooses a single price (and quality) to which it is committed forever, but in which consumers are uncertain about their future tastes.
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We will see that a similar e ect arises when there are strong network effects and di erentiated products (see Section 3.7). With network e ects and incompatible competition, consumers' desire to be compatible with others overwhelms their di erences in tastes and tends to drive the rms towards Bertrand competition. Here, with switching costs, each consumer's desire to be compatible with his future self (who in expectation has tastes closer to the average) likewise drives the rms towards undi erentiated-products Bertrand competition.
(ii) Consumers whose Expectations about Future Prices are 29 A related model with these consumer expectations is Borenstein, Mackie-Mason and Netz (2000) in which in nitely lived consumers purchase a di erentiated durable good (\equipment") in one period from one of two rms and an aftermarket product (\service") in the next period which must be purchased from the rm from which the durable was purchased. High service prices generate pro ts from locked-in customers purchasing service, but deter new customers from purchasing equipment because the latter expect high service prices in the following period. So the stationary equilibrium service price lies between marginal cost and the monopoly price.
30 The e ect we discussed in the previous subsection, 2.4.4|that rms moderate price competition in order to fatten and so soften their opponents|is also eliminated by von Weizs• acker's precommitment assumption.
Una ected by Current Prices
If consumers expect that a rm that unexpectedly cuts price this period will return to setting the expected price next period, then price changes are less permanent than taste di erences; thus switching costs raise price levels. Each consumer is making a product choice that his future selves must live with, and his future selves' preferences (while possibly di erent from his own) are likely to be closer to his currently-preferred product than to other products. So consumers are less in uenced by a current price cut than absent switching costs.
(iii) Consumers with Rational Expectations
If consumers have fully rational expectations they will recognise that a lower price today generally presages a higher price tomorrow. As we discussed above, a rm that wins more new consumers today will be a \fatter cat" with relatively greater incentive to price high tomorrow.
31 So consumers with rational expectations will be even less sensitive than in (ii) to price cutting, and switching costs thus raise prices.
32
In summary, while there is no unambiguous conclusion, Beggs and Klemperer (1992) conclude that there is a presumption that switching costs raise prices when new and old customers are charged a common price. There is therefore also a presumption that switching costs usually raise oligopolists' total pro ts.
33
31 This is true in existing models, e.g., Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Klemperer (1987a,b,c), Padilla (1992 Padilla ( , 1995 . One caveat is that, as discussed above, the fat cat e ect can sometimes be reversed. Another caveat is that with incomplete information about rms' costs a lower price might signal lower costs, so consumers might rationally infer that a lower price today presaged a lower price tomorrow. On the other hand, incomplete information about costs could also result in rms signalling to each other and, since rms might signal higher costs to their rivals in order to soften future competition, this might be a force for higher prices.
32 Holmes (1990) analyses price-setting by a monopolist facing overlapping generations of consumers who must sink costs before using the monopolist's good. He nds that if consumers have rational expectations, then prices are higher than those that would prevail if the rm could commit to future prices for essentially this reason: rational consumers are insensitive to price cuts because they understand that a low price today will encourage consumers to sink more costs which in turn results in higher prices in subsequent periods.
33 [Note Ex] This presumption seems widespread: see for example, Porter (1980, 1985) . We know of no convincing empirical evidence, but Cason and Friedman (2002) provide supportive laboratory evidence.
Collusive Behavior
The arguments above do not consider collusive behavior in which high prices are supported by rms punishing any other rm thought to have deviated.
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With complete information, switching costs make deviating from a collusive agreement less pro table because it is harder to quickly \steal" another rm's customers, but for the same reason switching costs make it harder to punish a deviating rm. So it is not obvious whether collusion is easier or more di cult than absent switching costs, and in Padilla's (1995) model, switching costs actually make collusion harder. While many people's intuition is that switching costs support collusion, this remains unclear as a theoretical matter.
Consumers Who Use Multiple Suppliers
In the models above, as in most leading models of switching costs, switching costs a ect prices but there is no switching in equilibrium. In reality a consumer may use di erent suppliers in di erent periods, either because 34 For example, Beggs and Klemperer assume each rm's price depends only on its current market share and not otherwise on history, thus ruling out the kind of strategies described by, for example, Abreu (1988) or Green and Porter (1984) that support collusive outcomes in contexts without switching costs.
35 Gabrielson and Vagstad (2000) explore how the heterogeneity of switching costs a ects the ability of duopolists to support a collusive outcome.
rms' products are di erentiated and the consumer has (su ciently) changing tastes, or because the di erences between rms' prices to the consumer change (su ciently) over time|the latter case often arises when rms o er lower prices to new customers than to existing customers.
Furthermore, although we have thus far assumed each consumer buys at most a single unit from a single rm in each period, a consumer who values variety may buy multiple products even in a single period. Consumers may therefore use multiple suppliers in a period or, as we will discuss, rms may each produce a range of di erent products.
Paying Consumers to Switch
Most papers in the switching costs literature assume a rm o ers the same price to all consumers in any given period. However, rms may want to price discriminate between old locked-in customers and customers who nd it costly or di cult to switch to them. And indeed rms often pay consumers to switch to them from rivals. For example, long-distance phone carriers make one-time payments to customers switching from a rival; credit card providers o er lower interest rates only for balance transfers from another provider; and economics departments pay higher salaries to faculty members moving from other departments, etc.
Chen (1997) analyses a two-period, two-rm, model in which each rm can charge a price to its old customers that is di erent from the price it charges to other consumers in the same period. In e ect, the consumers are in two separate markets in the second period according to which rm they bought from in period 1. Each rm acts like an incumbent monopolist in the market for its old customers, and like a new entrant in the market for the other rm's customers, so each of the two period-2 markets is like the single period-2 market of our core (section 2.3.1) two-period model. In that model all consumers had the same switching cost, so the period-2 incumbent charged a price that was higher than the entrant's price, but that was nevertheless just low enough that there was no actual switching. An important point that Taylor makes is that when there are just two rms the low switching cost consumers who leave their current supplier have only one rm to switch to, and this other rm can therefore make positive pro ts even on its new customers (when switching costs are heterogeneous).
Therefore duopolists earn positive economic pro t in equilibrium. But with three or more rms, there are always at least two new rms vying for any consumers willing to leave their current supplier and, if the new rms' products are undi erentiated, these rms will bid away their entire expected lifetime 36 Nilssen showed that prices depend on whether switching costs are learning costs or transactional costs: compared with the case of learning costs, transactional costs give consumers lower incentives to switch which yields lower prices for new consumers and higher prices for loyal consumers (and so lower social welfare since he assumes downwardsloping demand).
37 Likewise, the simple model of section 2.4.1 shows that if rms can price discriminate, the price will be c + (1 )s to all old consumers, and will be s lower to new consumers, but no consumers will ever actually switch.
38 However Arbatskaya's (2000) two-period model with some functional product di erentiation as well as switching costs does not yield this \independence" result.
pro ts from serving the consumers in their competition to attract them. So with three or more rms, rms earn positive rents only on their base of current customers, and these rents merely exactly o set the up-front investment required to attract the current customers.
These \paying customers to switch" models emphasise that switching costs, at least in theory, tend to generate higher rather than lower prices to repeat purchasers|contrary to many people's perceptions that customers are rewarded for loyalty. Taylor's model provides one possible resolution of this apparent contradiction. He shows that if switching costs are transactional, consumers may move between suppliers to credibly signal their (already) low switching costs and so secure more favourable terms of trade. Because this switching is socially costly, equilibrium contracts may discourage it through \loyal customer" pricing policies that give better terms to loyal customers (who have always purchased from the same rm) than to other old customers who patronised other rms in the past. But Taylor nevertheless nds that rms charge the lowest prices to new customers. Sha er and Zhang (2000) study a single period model which is similar to the second period of Chen's model but in which the distributions of switching costs from the two di erent rms are di erent. In this case if one rm's customers have lower and less heterogeneous switching costs than the other rm's customers, then from the rst rm's perspective its loyal-customer demand is more elastic than its new-customer demand and it may therefore charge a lower price to its loyal customers than to customers switching from the rival. But in this model it is never possible for both rms to charge lower prices to loyal customers than to switching customers.
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There are also models of contractual switching costs that result in lower 39 Lee (1997) also studies a one-period switching cost model which has similarities to the second period of Chen's model. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) explore a two-period model with some similar features to Chen's, in which rms price discriminate between consumers based on their past demands, but in a context with real functional product di erentiation between rms and without real (socially costly) switching costs; they too nd that loyal customers are charged higher prices than switchers. However, they also show that rms may wish to o er long-term contracts that in e ect o er consumers a high period-one price in return for a guaranteed low period-two price (see Section 2.8.3). (Villas-Boas (1999) analyses a many-period model similar to Fudenberg and Tirole's but does not consider long-term contracts.) Acquisti and Varian (2002) present a related two-period monopoly model which can be interpreted as being of consumers with switching costs. e ective prices to repeat customers than to new customers, and contracts that favour repeat customers arise endogeously in some of these models (see Section 2.8.3). But the literature has found it hard to explain how real switching costs might generate discrimination in favor of old customers.
Is There Too Much Switching?
Consumers decide whether or when to switch, and pay the switching costs.
For them to make socially correct switching decisions, the switching costs they bear must be real social costs, and the di erences between rms' prices must equal the di erences between rms' costs and be una ected by consumers' decisions. 40 In particular, there will generally be the wrong amount of switching if (i) rms' relative prices to a consumer fail to re ect their relative marginal costs, or (ii) consumers switch (or not) in order to a ect rms' future prices, or (iii) the switching costs are not real social costs.
(i) price di erences don't re ect cost di erences
In the previous subsection (2.5.1) rms charge lower prices to their new consumers, and the di erences between rms' prices to a given consumer generally fail to re ect any cost di erences between rms, so ine cient switching results. Importantly, this arises even when rms price symmetrically (i.e., all rms charge high prices to old customers and lower prices to new customers), because prices to any given consumer are then not symmetric.
Furthermore, we saw in Section 2.4 that even when rms do not price discriminate between new and old consumers, rms with larger customer bases will charge larger markups over their marginal costs. So if consumers have di ering switching costs, the incumbent or dominant rm charges a price that exploits its old high switching-cost customers while allowing its low switching-cost consumers to switch to a smaller rm or new entrant.
See, for example, Gabszewicz, Pepall and Thisse (1992), Farrell and Shapiro (1988), Wang and Wen (1998); in all these cases there is excessive switching 40 Consumers must also have rational expectations about future price di erences, etc. Consumers can, of course, make socially correct decisions if the distortions are not too large, as for example in the model of Section 2.3.1 in which the consumer's current supplier raises price in the second period by an amount that just avoids the consumer switching.
to smaller rms and entrants.
41
(ii) consumers switch in order to a ect prices If a consumer is a large fraction of the market, or if rms can discriminate between consumers (so each consumer is, in e ect, a separate market), a consumer may switch to a ect future prices.
If switching costs are learning costs, switching strengthens a consumer's outside option, so if each consumer is a separate market we might observe excessive switching as consumers switch in order to strengthen their bargain- Consumers may also commit to ignore switching costs in making future purchase decisions, in order to force the incumbent supplier to price more competitively (Cabral and Greenstein (1990)); 42 this will generally lead to socially excessive switching ex post.
(iii) switching costs are not real social costs 41 [note k88] Even if all consumers have the same switching costs, if an entrant's production cost combined with consumers' switching cost exceeds the incumbent's production cost, then in a quantity-competition model the entrant will charge a smaller markup than the incumbent to the incumbent's old consumers and sell to some of them, thus inducing ine cient switching (Klemperer (1988) ). This result is exactly analogous to the standard oligopoly result that a higher-cost rm charges a smaller markup and so wins a socially excessive market share. It does not depend on whether or not the model allows price discrimination. 42 The literature has largely assumed that consumers have no commitment power (see Section 2.8 for exceptions); in most contexts this assumption is both natural and also probably unimportant.
If switching costs are contractual, and not social costs, consumers will ceteris paribus switch less than is e cient. But if real (social) switching costs exist, then contractual switching costs may prevent socially ine cient switches of the types discussed above. 
Multiproduct Firms
A consumer who buys several related products in a single period may incur additional \shopping costs" for each additional supplier used. These shopping costs may be the same as the switching costs incurred by consumers who change suppliers between periods. However, the dynamic issues that switching-cost models usually emphasise no longer arise. In particular, rms and consumers can contract on all prices, so the analogy with economies of scope in production is particularly strong. Thus shopping costs provide an e ciency reason for multiproduct rms just as economies of scope in production do.
The analogy is not perfect, because switching costs and shopping costs are based on speci c consumer-rm matches, whereas the production-side (2000) rms endogenously o er long term contracts that create contractual switching costs that reduce ine cient switching to less preferred products and increase social welfare, conditional on rms being permitted to price discriminate between old and new customers.
44 As we noted in Section 2.1, if rms can discriminate between consumers, then each consumer becomes an independent market which, in the presence of switching costs, is closely analogous to a market with production economies of scope.
of the same result if consumers' shopping costs are replaced by productionside economies of scope (because selling an additional variety lowers the rm's marginal costs of its current products). In both cases each rm, and therefore the market, may therefore provide too many di erent products.
More obviously, mergers can be explained either by consumer switching costs (Klemperer and Padilla (1997)) or by production economies of scope.
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Some results about single-product competition over many periods with switching costs carry over to multiproduct competition in a single period with shopping costs. For example, we suggested earlier in this section that oligopolists might bene t by synchronizing their sales to minimize switching and so reduce the pool of highly price-sensitive (no-switching cost) customers. suggests that each rm may produce too many products, but that there may nevertheless be too little variety produced by the industry as a whole.
An important set of shopping-cost models are the \mix-and-match" models pioneered by Matutes and Regibeau (1988) , Economides (1989) and Einhorn (1992). Most of this literature takes each rm's product-line as given, and asks whether rms prefer to be compatible (no shopping costs) or incompatible (e ectively in nite shopping costs); see Sections 2.7.3 and 2.8.
Similarly, when rms \bundle" products (see, e.g., Whinston (1990), Nalebu (1999, 2000)) they are creating contractual shopping costs between their products; we discuss bundling brie y in Sections 2.7.3 and 2.8.
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Since shopping costs are not technologically distinct from switching costs (the term \shopping costs" merely seems more natural in a single-period context), we henceforth use the term switching costs to cover all these costs. 45 Dranove and White (1996) models hospitals as multi-product providers with switching costs between providers.
46 Varian's (1989) and Stole's (forthcoming) surveys describe models of quantity discounts and bundling in detail in Volume 1 and the current volume of this Series, respectively.
Battles for Market Share 2.6.1 The Value of Market Share
We have seen that with switching costs (or indeed proprietary network e ects| see Section 3.7), a rm's current customer base is an important determinant of its future pro ts.
We can therefore write a rm's current-period value function, (i.e., total discounted future pro ts), V t, as the sum of its current pro ts, t , and its discounted next-period value function V t+1 ( t ); in which is the discount factor and the next-period value function, V t+1 ( ); is a function of the size of its current-period customer base, t .
Obviously, this is a simpli cation. In general, the rm's future pro ts depend on which customers it has sold to and these customers' full histories, how market share is distributed among competing rms, how many consumers in the market make no purchase, etc. However, in the simplest models V t+1 depends only on current-period market share|for example, this is true of Klemperer (1987b Klemperer ( , 1995 , Farrell and Shapiro (1988), Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Padilla (1992 Padilla ( , 1995 , and Chen and Rosenthal (1996) which all model just two rms and a xed set of consumers whose reservation prices are su cient that they always purchase. (For example, equation
(1) shows for Beggs and Klemperer's model how prices, and therefore also quantities, and hence value functions, in a period are a function of the rm's previous-period market share.) So t is often interpreted as \market share", and this explains rms' very strong concern with market shares in markets with switching costs and/or (we shall see) network e ects.
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47 Because switching costs make current market share such an important determinant of a manufacturer's future pro ts, Valletti (2000) suggests they may provide a strong motive for vertical integration with retailers to ensure su cient investment in a base of repeat subscribers.
Penetration Pricing
The rm's rst-order condition for the optimal choice of its period-t price given rivals' strategies is then
Provided that the rm's value fraction is increasing in its market share, @V t+1 =@ t > 0, 48 therefore, the rm charges a lower price or sets a higher quantity than would be short-run pro t maximising in order to raise its customer base and hence its future pro ts. That is, @ t =@p t > 0 (since we assume @ t =@p t < 0). (Similar results apply if, as in section 2.5, the rm sets di erent prices to di erent groups of consumers in any period.)
In the early stages of a market, therefore, when few consumers have switching costs, so even short-run pro t-maximising prices are not high relative to costs, equation (3) implies low, \penetration", pricing. This is, of course, just the generalisation of the period-1 \bargain pricing" that arises in the simple two-period model described in Section 2.3.1.
It is clear from (3) that the larger the value of the future market, V t+1 ; the deeper, ceteris paribus, the penetration pricing will be. For example, a more rapidly growing market will have lower prices. 49 50 Of course, as noted in Section 2.3.2, in a more general model the \penetration" might be through advertising or other marketing activities rather than just low prices.
48 This need not apply: stealing customers from rival(s) may make the rival(s) so much more aggressive that the rm is worse o . See Banerjee and Summers (1987), Klemperer (1987c). Usually, however, @V t+1 =@ t > 0:
In Beggs and Klemperer (1992), V t+1 is quadratic in t : (The fact that the sum of the duopolists' value functions is therefore maximised at the boundaries is consistent with stable dynamics because lowering current price is less costly in current pro ts for the rm with the smaller market share. See Budd et al (1993).)
We can perform a similar analysis with similar results for a quantity-setting rm. 49 See, for example, Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Borenstein, Mackie-Mason and Netz (2000) and also Holmes' (1990) steady-state model of a monopolist selling a single product to overlapping generations of consumers who incur set-up costs before purchasing the product.
50 It seems unclear whether we should expect \penetration pricing" patterns from a monopolist, since the magnitude of @V t+1 =@ t may be smaller in monopoly|where consumers have nowhere else to go|than in oligopoly, and durable-goods e ects imply falling prices in monopoly absent switching-cost e ects (equation (3) only implies that early period prices are lower than in the absence of switching-costs, not that prices necessarily rise). Cabral et al (1999) show it is hard to obtain penetration pricing in a network-e ects monopoly model (see Section 3.6).
Harvesting vs Investing: Macroeconomic and International Trade Applications
Equations (2) and (3) show that any rm must in every period t balance the incentive to charge high prices to \harvest" greater current pro ts ( (3) showed t is increasing in p t ) against the incentive for low prices that \invest" in market share and hence increase future pro ts (V t+1 is increasing in t ;
which is decreasing in p t ):
Anything that increases the marginal value of market share will make the rm lower price further to invest more in market share. Thus, for example, a lower , that is, a higher real interest rate, reduces the present value of future market share (see (2)) so leads to higher current prices (see (3): lower implies lower @ t =@p t implies higher p t 51 ).
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) develop this logic in a switching-costs model based on the two-period model in Klemperer (1995). They argue that liquidity-constrained supermarkets perceive very high real interest rates and therefore set high prices, sacri cing future pro ts in order to raise cash and survive in the short term. Their theory is supported by empirical evidence that shows that the most nancially-constrained supermarket chains do indeed raise their prices relative to less nancially-constrained chains during recessions.
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Fitoussi and Phelps (1988) use a similar logic (although emphasising search costs rather than switching costs) to argue that high interest rates contributed to the high rates of in ation in Europe in the early 1980s.
Froot and Klemperer (1989) also apply the same logic to international trade in a general model of competition for market share motivated by switching costs and network e ects. A current appreciation of the domestic currency lowers a foreign rm's costs (expressed in the domestic currency) so tends to lower prices, but if the appreciation is expected to be only temporary then the fact that the domestic currency will be worth less tomorrow is 51 This assumes stable, symmetric, oligopoly and that the dominant e ect of lowering is the direct e ect. All these arguments are discussed in more detail in Klemperer (1995).
52 Beggs and Klemperer (1989, Section 5.3) and Klemperer (1995) provide further discussion of how \booms" and \busts" a ect the trade-o s embodied in equation (3) and hence a ect price-cost margins.
equivalent to an increase in the real interest rates which raises prices. So exchange-rate changes that are expected to be temporary may have very little impact on import prices. Conversely, if the currency is anticipated to appreciate in the future, both the \cost e ect" and \interest-rate e ect" are in the same direction|market share tomorrow is probably worth more if future costs are lower, and tomorrow's pro ts are worth more than today's pro ts, so for both reasons today is a good time to invest in market share rather than harvest current pro ts. So import prices may be very sensitive to anticipated exchange-rate changes. Both Froot and Klemperer (1989) and Sapir and Sekkat (1995) provide empirical support for these theories. 
Entry
Switching costs may have important e ects on entry: with real, exogenous switching costs, small scale entry to win new, unattached, consumers is often easy and indeed often too easy, but winning even part of the business of old \locked-in" customers may not just be hard, but also be too hard from the social standpoint.
Furthermore, these results take the switching costs as given. Firms may also create unnecessary switching costs purely in order to discourage entry.
Small-Scale Entry is (Too) Easy
We saw in Section 2.4 that if rms cannot discriminate between old and new consumers, then the \fat cat" e ect may make small scale entry very easy: incumbent rms' desire to extract pro ts from their old customers creates a price umbrella under which entrants can pro tably win new unattached (or low switching cost) customers. And even after entry has occurred, the erstwhile incumbent(s) will continue to charge higher prices than the entrant, and lose market share to the entrant so long as they remain \fatter" rms with more old consumers to exploit. (2002)) that emphasises the adverse selection problem that an entrant faces: creditworthy borrowers may have been granted high credit limits by their current card issuers so have higher switching costs. Furthermore, low-default risk customers may be less willing to switch (or even search) because they do not intend to borrow|but these customers often do borrow nevertheless (Ausubel, 1991). Calem and Mester provide empirical evidence supporting the view that this adverse selection is important, Ausubel provides evidence that the US bank credit card market earns positive economic pro t and attributes this, at least in part, to switching costs or search costs, and Stango also argues that switching costs are an important in uence on pricing.
55 Similarly, low cost incompatible entry can be ine cient in the presence of network e ects.
consumers, and only applies to switching buyers at the average level of their switching cost, not at the marginal switching cost. So the social returns to entry are not fully captured by the entrant, and e cient entry may be blocked.
Furthermore, e cient entry can sometimes be strategically blockaded.
In particular, an incumbent may \limit price", that is, cut price to increase output prior to threatened entry, to lock in more customers and make entry unpro table at the necessary scale, when entry at the same scale would have been pro table, and perhaps e cient, if the additional customers had not been \locked-up" prior to entry (see Klemperer (1987c) ).
Of course, new entry can be too easy or too hard for more standard reasons. New entry can be too hard if it expands market output, and consumers rather than the entrant capture the surplus generated. And entry is too easy if its main e ect is to shift pro ts from the incumbent to the entrant.
56 But these caveats apply whether or not there are switching costs; the arguments speci c to switching costs suggest that entry that depends for its success on consumers switching is not just hard, but too hard.
Single-Product Entry May Be (Too) Hard
We saw in Section 2.5.3 that switching costs (or shopping costs) can \tie" sales together so consumers prefer not to patronise more than one rm, and it follows that a new entrant may be forced to o er a full range of products to attract new customers (let alone any old consumers). If o ering a full range is impractical, entry can e ectively be foreclosed. Thus in Whinston (1990), Nalebu (1999), and Klemperer and Padilla (1997), the tying of a product to a product in a di erent market can foreclose rms that can only sell single products. In Whinston and Nalebu the \switching costs" are contractual,
56 Klemperer (1988) illustrates the latter case, showing that new entry into a mature market with switching costs can sometimes be socially undesirable. The point is that just as entry of a rm whose costs exceed the incumbent's is often ine cient in a standard Cournot model without switching costs (Bulow et al, 1985 , section, VI E, Mankiw and Whinston, 1986) so entry of a rm whose production cost plus consumers' switching cost exceeds the incumbent's production cost is often ine cient in a quantity-setting model with switching costs (see note K88).
while in Klemperer and Padilla the products are \tied" by real switching costs.
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If the switching costs are real, entry need not be too hard given the switching costs, but the arguments of the previous subsection suggest it often may be.
Arti cial Switching Costs Make Entry (Too) Hard
The previous discussion addressed whether entry is too easy or too hard, taking the switching costs as given. However, the larger issue is probably whether the switching costs either are, or need to be, real social costs. They may instead be contractual such as those imposed by \loyalty contracts" that return a fraction of past payments to customers who continue to patronise the rm, or by \exclusive contracts" that require customers to pay damages if they fail to do so, or by \bundling" or \tying" products to make it uneconomical for consumers to buy single products from di erent rms. Or the switching costs may be real but caused by an unnecessary technological choice that an entrant cannot copy. In these cases, large-scale entry is probably too hard (see Section 2.7.2), but it is the incumbent's ability to choose incompatibility that is the crucial entry barrier.
Endogenous Switching Costs: Choosing How to Compete
[Market participants may seek to either raise or to lower switching costs in order to reduce ine ciencies (including the switching cost itself), to enhance market power, to deter new entry, or to extract returns from a new entrant:]
Reducing Switching Costs to Enhance E ciency
As we have seen, a rm that cannot commit not to exploit its ex-post monopoly power must charge a lower introductory price. If the price-path (or quality-path) is very ine cient for the rm and consumers jointly, the rm's surplus as well as joint surplus may be increased by nullifying the switching 57 Choi (1996a) shows that the tying of markets where R&D is critical can allow a rm with an R&D lead in just one market to pre-empt both. The welfare e ects are ambiguous.
costs. Thus, for example, a company may license a second source to create a future competitor to which consumers can costlessly switch (Farrell and Gallini (1988) ).
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Likewise, rms producing di erentiated products (or product lines) may deliberately make them compatible (i.e., choose zero switching costs). This increases the variety of options available to consumers who can then \mix-and-match" products from more than one rm without paying a switching cost. So eliminating switching costs can raise all rms' demands, and hence all rms' pro ts.
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Where suppliers are unwilling to reduce switching costs (see below), third parties may supply converters, 60 or regulators may intervene.
We have also already noted that customers may incur the switching (or start-up) cost of using more than one supplier, 61 or may pre-commit to ignoring the switching costs in deciding whether to switch, 62 in order to force suppliers to behave more competitively.
Finally, rms may be able to mitigate the ine ciencies of distorted prices and/or qualities by developing reputations for behaving as if there were no switching costs. 
Increasing Switching Costs to Enhance E ciency
Firms may also mitigate the ine ciencies of distorted prices and qualities by vertically integrating with their customers.
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nds rms might set lower prices to loyal consumers to reduce ine cient switching. Of course, a downside of these strategies of increasing switching costs is that they also limit the variety available to consumers unless they pay the switching costs.
Increasing Switching Costs to Enhance Oligopoly Power
Although switching costs typically reduce social surplus, we saw in Sections 2.3-2.5 that they nevertheless often increase rms' pro ts. If so, rms jointly prefer to commit to real social switching costs than to no switching costs before they compete, so rms may arti cially create or increase switching costs.
Of course, a rm may prefer switching costs from but not to its product if it can achieve this, especially where the switching costs are real social costs, Shapiro (1989) call this the Principle of Negative Protection. The point is that it is better for customers to be exploited e ciently than ine ciently ex-post. So if contracts cannot set all future variables (e.g. can set prices but not qualities), so customers anyway expect to be exploited ex-post, it may be better that there are no contracts. 65 However, Kim and Koh (2002) nd that a rm with a small market share may reduce contractual switching costs by choosing to honour repeat-purchase coupons that its rivals have o ered to their old customers.
66 These papers are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this Volume, in Stole (forthcoming).
Reducing Switching Costs to Enhance Oligopoly Power
An important class of models which suggests that rms may often be biased towards too much compatibility from the social viewpoint is the \mix-andmatch" models (see Section 2.5) in which di erent rms have di erent abilities in producing the di erent components of a \system". Consumers' ability to mix-and-match the best product(s) o ered by each rm is an e ciency gain from compatibility, but rms' private gains from compatibility may be even greater:
Einhorn (1992) found in a simple Bertrand duopoly model that rms (jointly) more than appropriate the e ciency gain from compatibility (that is, from zero rather than in nite shopping costs) and so are biased towards excessive compatibility. The reason is that when a single consumer wants one each of a list of components produced by rms A, B, with production costs a i and b i respectively for component i, then in compatible competition the price for each component is maxfa i ; b i g, so the consumer pays a total price P i maxfa i ; b i g for the system. But if the rms are incompatible, the Bertrand price for a system is maxf P i a i ; P i b i g which is lower unless the same rm is best at everything. In words, if di erent rms are best at providing di erent components, then the winning seller on each component appropriates its full e ciency margin in compatible competition, but in incompatible competition the winner's margin is its e ciency advantage where it is best, minus its rival's advantage where its rival is best.
Of course, this depends on (among other assumptions) duopoly at each level. With more than two rms producing each component, the sum of the second-lowest cost of each component (which the consumer pays under compatibility) may easily be lower than the second-lowest system cost when rms are incompatible, so consumers often prefer compatibility and rms' incentives may be biased either way (see Farrell, Monroe and Saloner (1998)).
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The \order-statistic" e ect emphasised in these models is not the only force, however. Matutes and Regibeau (1988) stressed that under compati-67 Einhorn's results, but not those of Farrell, Monroe and Saloner, are qualitatively una ected by whether or not rms know their own e ciencies in each component. The analysis of these two papers is related to Palfrey (1983). bility a price cut by one rm in one component increases the demand for the other rms' complements, so compatibility reduces incentives to cut prices.
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Economides (1989) argued that, unlike the Einhorn result, this logic does not depend on duopoly, so provides a clear argument why rms may try too hard to reduce switching costs and shopping costs. 
Increasing Switching Costs to Prevent or Exploit Entry
We have seen (Section 2.7) that an incumbent rm may protect a monopoly position against entry by writing exclusionary contracts, or by arti cially creating real switching costs through technological incompatibility with potential entrants.
70 Imposing contractual switching costs (but not real social switching costs) can also be a mechanism for extracting rents from an entrant without preventing its entry|the entrant is forced to pay a fee (the \liquidated damages") to break the contracts.
71
68 Matutes and Regibeau (1992) allowed rms to set separate prices for bundles (not necessarily the sum of the component prices) and found that the force toward compatibility weakens. Furthermore, compatibility also changes the structure of demand, so even Matutes and Regibeau (1988) found that rms are sometimes biased towards incompatibility. And Klemperer (1992) also shows that rms may prefer incompatibility to compatibility when the latter is socially preferred, and that the rms may even distort their product choices to sustain incompatibility. Garcia Mariñoso (2001) examines a mixand-match model in which purchase takes place over two periods, and nds that rms are biased towards compatibility because it reduces the intensity of competition in the rst period { see also Hancap (2003) and Garcia Mariñoso (2003) . (All these models assume some product di erentiation between rms' components even under compatibility). See also Anderson and Leruth (1993) .
69 Most of the \mix-and-match" literature assumes that each rm o ers a full line of products, but DeNicolo (2000) analyzes competition with one full-line and a pair of specialist rms. In our terminology, there are then no additional shopping costs of buying from an additional specialist rm after having bought from one of the specialist rms, but the specialist rms do not internalize the complementarities between them.
70 Imposing switching costs would not be worthwhile for the incumbent if they reduced consumers' willingnesses to pay by more than the gains from excluding entry. In models such as Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1989), Segal and Whinston (2000), entry is only possible above some minimum e cient scale that is greater than any single customer's demands, so no individual customer loses by forgoing the possibility of using an alternative supplier if other customers have already forgone the possibility, and so no customer needs to be compensated for signing an exclusive contract.
Deterring entry is also pro 
Switching Costs and Policy
As we have seen, with (large) switching costs rms compete over streams of goods and services rather than over single transactions. So one must not jump from the fact that buyers become locked in to the conclusion that there is an overall competitive problem. Nor should one draw naive inferences from individual transaction prices, as if each transaction were the locus of ordinary competition. Some individual transactions may be priced well above cost even when no rm has (ex-ante) market power; others may be priced below cost without being in the least predatory. 72 , 73 Thus switching-cost markets can be more competitive than they look, and switching costs need not generate supernormal pro ts, even in a closed oligopoly.
But while switching costs need not cause competitive problems, they probably do make competition more fragile, especially when they coexist with ordinary scale economies. Because large-scale entry into switchingcost markets is hard, there may be much more incentive for monopolizing strategies such as predation or merger than there is in markets in which easy entry limits any market power. Thus switching costs, in combination with other factors, could justify heightened antitrust scrutiny.
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Furthermore, while sometimes (as in simple bargain-then-ripo models)
rms must give all their ex post rents to consumers in ex ante competition, that is not always true. The ex post rents may be less than fully competed away, as in the most of the oligopoly models we discussed. Alternatively the 72 For instance, in an aftermarket context such as the Kodak case, the fact that repair services are priced well above cost does not by itself prove that there is a serious competitive problem.
73 Another na• ve argument is that if one observes little or no switching, then rms do not constrain one another's prices: rms that compete on a life-cycle basis (rather than on an individual transaction basis) constrain one another's life-cycle prices and, of course, rms may be constrained even ex post by the threat of customer switching even when that threat is not carried out in equilibrium.
74 For example, the UK Competition Commission in July 2001 blocked the proposed merger of two banks, Lloyds TSB and Abbey National, even though Abbey National accounted for only 5 per cent of the market for personal banking. An important part of the Commission's reasoning was that consumer switching costs, combined with some scale economies, make new entry very hard, and that existing rms with low market shares tend to compete more aggressively than rms with higher shares in markets with switching costs, so smaller rms are particularly valuable competitors to retain. (Klemperer is a UK Competition Commissioner, but was not involved in this decision.) See also Lofaro and Ridyard (2003) .
ex post rents may be dissipated in unproductive activities such as excessive marketing or advertising in which case consumers are harmed by switching costs, even though rms may be no better o . So switching costs often do raise average prices. Moreover, switching costs often cause an ine cient bargain-then-ripo pattern of prices even when the average level of prices remains competitive; they make matching less e cient by discouraging rematching or the use of multiple suppliers; and, of course, they result in direct costs when consumers do switch.
For these reasons, despite the warnings in our rst paragraph, markets may indeed perform less well with switching costs than without, so policy intervention to reduce switching costs may be appropriate.
75 For example, policy might cautiously override intellectual property rights, especially of copyright-like intellectual property that may have little inherent novelty, if those rights are used only as a tool to enforce incompatibility and so create private rewards that bear no relationship to the innovation's incremental value.
In general rms may be biased either towards or against compatibility relative to the social standpoint. But switching costs seem more likely to lower than to raise e ciency, so when rms favor switching costs the reason is often because they enhance monopoly or oligopoly power by directly raising prices or by inhibiting new entry. 76 This suggests that policy-makers should take a close look when rms with market power choose to have switching costs (through contract form or product design) when choosing compatibility 75 Gans and King (2001) examine the regulatory trade-o s in intervening to reduce switching costs and show that who is required to bear the costs of ameliorating switching costs may be an important determinant of the e ciency of the outcome. See also Galbi (2001).
Viard (2003) found that the introduction of number portability for U.S. toll-free telephone services substantially reduced switching costs and led to the largest rm substantially reducing prices; the U.S. wireless industry has strongly resisted the FCC's proposals to introduce number portability in the wireless market. Aoki and Small (2000) and Gans, King, and Woodbridge (2001) also analyse number portability in the telecoms market.
76 A caveat is that rms often do not make a coordinated joint choice of whether to compete with switching costs or without, and di erent rms may be able to control the costs of di erent switches. See Section 2.8.
would be no more costly.
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3 Network E ects and Competition 3.1 Introduction
CONCLUSION
77 For example, the Swedish competition authority argued that Scandinavian Airlines' \frequent-yer" program blocked new entry on just one or a few routes in the Swedish domestic air-travel market in which entry on the whole range of routes was impractical (see Section 2.7.3), and the airline was ordered to alter the program from October 2001. A similar decision was made by the Norwegian competition authority with e ect from April 2002. Fernandes (2001) provides some support for these decisions by studying alliances formed by U.S. airlines, and showing that \frequent-yer" programs that cover more routes are more attractive to consumers and confer greater market power on the airlines operating the programs. See also Klemperer and Png (1986) . 78 A caveat is that the policy debate is often held ex-post of some lock-in. At this point incumbents obviously favor maintaining high switching costs and their preference is not evidence that switching costs raise prices overall (nor is it necessarily ine cient). Reducing switching costs ex-post also expropriates the incumbents' ex-ante investments, possibly raising concerns about harming dynamic e ciency.
